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
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
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[Vietnam]: Hanoi is continuing its efforts to pump up the political image of the National Liberation Front.

The recent growth in Communist propaganda claims about the extent of the Front's "governing" role in South Vietnam is being accompanied by an accelerated program to expand the Front's diplomatic representation. In the past two months the Communists have implemented, or moved to implement, virtually all the agreements made over the years to set up permanent Front missions abroad.

In August, Front offices were opened almost simultaneously in Albania, Bulgaria, Mongolia, and Rumania--the only Communist countries where they were lacking. During the past two weeks, missions have been opened in Paris and Stockholm. [redacted] [redacted] permanent offices will be established in Tanzania and Syria by the end of October.

In attempting to improve the status of the Front, the Communists probably have its potential role in the Paris talks and a postwar settlement in mind.

* * * *

Communist offensive activity continues at a relatively low ebb. There is no evidence that additional Communist elements have withdrawn from forward combat areas. There are continuing indications, moreover, that elements which have pulled back are engaged in resupply and refitting activity.

Despite allied success in disrupting enemy supply activity, it appears that the Communists still have substantial munitions and weapons caches available for future offensive operations in some combat areas. Documents captured in an area south of Saigon, for example, indicate that enemy war [redacted]

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[supplies shipped into Long An Province during the summer were substantially larger than the amounts captured by allied units on search operations throughout the area.

Other evidence indicates that the enemy is making a greater effort to obtain food throughout Vietnam. According to the enemy radio, the central committee of the Front has ordered a rice procurement program on a top priority basis through the end of harvest season in early 1969. Reporting [redacted] indicates that shortages of food are more severe for the enemy units this year than in the past. [redacted]

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UK: Planning is in full swing for an anti - Vietnam war demonstration in London on 27 October.

This is likely to be the largest Vietnam protest demonstration ever staged there. Marchers may number 15,000 to 20,000. This is well below the organizers' claim of 100,000, but above the number that have taken part in previous such demonstrations in Britain. The sponsors include political clubs and intellectual and trade union groups, as well as the Communist Party, Maoists, Trotskyites, and anarchists.

A split among the organizers may result in two separate demonstrations, [redacted] [redacted] The majority want to make the theme opposition to UK "complicity" in Vietnam. They plan to direct most of their activity--ostensibly nonviolent--against British facilities.

A militant minority, perhaps as many as 3,000, want the demonstration focused against US installations, especially the US Embassy, a favorite target of past protests. This group supports violence. Three large anti-Vietnam demonstrations within the past year have turned into battles with the police, resulting in many injuries and arrests.

If the extremists are frustrated in their plans to assault the embassy, they may attempt to attack or seize other US Government facilities or US-owned businesses. They may also harass these installations prior to 27 October.

The British will use a large number of lightly equipped police to control the demonstrators. [redacted] [redacted]

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Czechoslovakia-USSR: The talks between Czechoslovak and Soviet leaders ended yesterday, but there has not yet been any indication that an agreement has been concluded on the future status of the occupation troops.

The communiqué was issued yesterday at the end of two days of talks in Moscow between premiers Cernik and Kosygin. It made no reference to a settlement of the problem or to the expected status-of-forces treaty which would regulate the indefinite stationing of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia. The communiqué indicated only that the two sides "exchanged views" on certain questions concerning the Moscow agreements of 26 August, especially regarding "the conditions of a temporary stationing of Soviet troops" in Czechoslovakia.

Press sources differ on whether or not agreement has been reached. A Prague correspondent in Moscow has said that in addition to a status-of-forces agreement, the Soviets are authorized to negotiate the departure of other Warsaw Pact troops and the economic and legal aspects of their "temporary" stay. According to the same correspondent, the treaty will be signed today.

Premier Cernik, who headed the official Czechoslovak delegation to the Moscow talks on 14 October, was expected by the Czechoslovak news agency to return to Prague last night or early this morning.

[REDACTED]

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East Germany: Pankow's efforts to justify its role in the invasion of Czechoslovakia have done little to mollify the public.

There are now apprehensive rumors among the populace that, as a result of the situation in Czechoslovakia, the East German military forces are to be enlarged, and that stricter limitations will be imposed on contacts with West Germans.

The media have been saturated with lame explanations of the "aid operation of the allied socialist forces," and the party has organized numerous "ideological-political orientation" sessions to browbeat cultural, literary, and youth groups. Pankow has placed particularly heavy pressure on church leaders to squelch opposition from that quarter. Some religious leaders had earlier defied the authorities openly on this matter.

These pressure tactics, however, apparently have failed to produce the desired results. Many people do not believe the official explanations and, despite a tightening of police controls, there have been sporadic cases of open defiance. [REDACTED]

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Arab States - Israel: There is still no indication of a significant breakthrough in the search for a Middle East settlement.

25X1 Arab public reaction is hostile to the Israeli "nine-point peace" plan, as enunciated by Foreign Minister Eban in the General Assembly on 8 October. The Arabs charge that Eban proposed "nothing new" and that Israel still refuses to accept and begin implementation of the November 1967 Security Council resolution, particularly regarding Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories. Some Arab leaders [redacted] concede a faint hope in Israeli willingness to conduct indirect negotiations.

25X1 The Arabs, meanwhile, charge that the timing of the announcement of the US decision to begin negotiations with Israel on the sale of Phantom aircraft has dealt a damaging blow to the mediation efforts of UN special representative Jarring. Arab reaction to the US announcement has been universally unfavorable. While not really surprised at the US decision, the Arabs decry the move as a further confirmation of US alignment with Israel. The moderate Arab states in particular have expressed the fear that a Phantom deal will bring a new spiral of Soviet arms deliveries. [redacted]

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Jordan: The government appears headed for a confrontation with Palestinian terrorist organizations in the country.

The Jordanian chief of staff has ordered that, as of 15 October, members of terrorist groups may not carry arms or wear uniforms in major Jordanian towns and their vehicles will be subject to check and search by Jordanian authorities. All terrorist plans and operations must be cleared and coordinated with Jordanian military authorities.

Terrorist leaders were given the new regulations at a meeting several days ago and rejected them out of hand. They have been supported in their action by the National Charter Group, a political opposition front containing a melange of Nasirists, Baathists, and Communists.

King Husayn, who is presently in London, publicly backed his government's efforts to restrain the terrorists with the statement that he will not allow Jordan to be ruled by the Palestinian fedayeen.

The King and his government may be in for serious trouble. Sympathy for the terrorists is strong throughout the country, and a major effort to control them could produce a dangerous challenge to the government.

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USSR-Yemen: Moscow has offered military and economic assistance to Yemen, but under conditions which the Yemenis will find difficult to meet.

The communiqué winding up Premier al-Amri's visit to Moscow from 30 September to 5 October was vague on the subject of future Soviet aid commitments to Yemen.

25X1 [redacted] Moscow told the visiting delegation that it was prepared to agree to Yemeni requests but only if certain political conditions were met. These reportedly included forming a new government acceptable to all the republican factions, including the exiles, and disarming the tribes and bringing them under government control. The Yemeni delegation found the conditions humiliating but accepted them subject to further bilateral discussion.

The Soviets probably do not believe that the Yemenis either intend to meet these conditions or will be able to do so. The Soviets might want the pro-Soviet former president, al-Sallal, back in the government, but the current leaders would not permit this. Moscow should have no illusions that the tribes, which hold the ultimate power in this bitterly divided country, will allow themselves to be disarmed. It is more likely that the Soviets, having reduced their aid to Yemen, will be unwilling to undertake broad new commitments until a more reliable and politically stable republican government is created in Sana. [redacted]

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
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Countries Affected by Locust Plague



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India - Latin America: Prime Minister Indira Gandhi recently concluded a successful but unexceptional three-week goodwill tour of eight Latin American countries. The trip is not expected to result in any significant increase in political or commercial relations. This was the first visit of an Indian prime minister to the area and demonstrates India's continuing interest in expanding its international contacts and influence. [REDACTED]

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Africa: The locusts in Ethiopia apparently have not done widespread damage to crops thus far, partly because of effective spraying and the fact that weather conditions have been unfavorable to them. Although the danger is not yet over, easterly winds are preventing new swarms from entering the country from the Sudan. These winds, however, are carrying the locusts westward into Chad and toward Niger. [REDACTED]

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